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Republican National Committee

All the President's Men

The Republican National Committee enters the Watergate account at a point when reporters were testing whether the break-in suspects’ claimed connections to convention security could explain their presence in political operations. The evidence distinguishes the party organization from the Committee for the Re-election of the President: a Republican National Committee official rejected the claim that James McCord had worked security for the convention and described the re-election committee as an organization that cared about Richard Nixon, not the party. The committee’s significance lies in that boundary—and in the internal Republican criticism that made the boundary visible.

Organization and political setting

During the investigation, Woodward contacted the Republican National Committee alongside the re-election committee and Republican officials involved in planning the national convention. The calls followed a report that Eugenio Martinez had asked a University of Miami housing officer whether the university could accommodate about 3,000 Young Republicans for the convention. The Republican National Committee and the other offices contacted said they had never heard of Martinez or of a plan to house the convention group at the university. Their denials showed that the reporters were checking an alleged logistical connection against the people and institutions responsible for convention planning, rather than treating a suspect’s political association as confirmation.

The distinction between the Republican National Committee and the Committee for the Re-election of the President became more pointed when Bernstein spoke with a party official involved in convention-security planning. The official rejected the re-election committee’s account that McCord had been a convention-security consultant: McCord, he said, had never done security work of any kind for the convention. He assumed McCord had instead been handling security for the re-election committee. The official’s account thus separated the party’s convention arrangements from the security work attributed to the Nixon campaign organization.

A party official’s challenge to the re-election committee

The official’s remarks went beyond correcting a specific claim. He said that the people at the Committee for the Re-election of the President cared only about Richard Nixon and could not care less about the Republican Party; given the opportunity, he said, they would wreck it. The accusation framed the campaign committee not as a routine extension of the party but as a separate operation whose priorities could damage the institution whose name it shared politically.

Asked whether he believed John Mitchell and the re-election committee’s denials of involvement, the official laughed. He recalled that he and Robert Dole had discussed the arrests on the day they occurred and had suspected that one of the minor figures around the committee or the White House was responsible. The names they had considered were Murray Chotiner and Charles Colson. This was a report of the official’s suspicion, not proof of either man’s responsibility; its importance in the account is that a Republican insider’s doubts cut against the public denials and widened the reporters’ inquiry beyond the burglars themselves.

Investigative significance and limits

The Republican National Committee’s role in these episodes is principally that of a source of convention-planning information and of an institutional counterpoint to the Nixon re-election operation. Its officials’ denial about McCord gave reporters a reason to distinguish convention security from the security work undertaken for the re-election committee. The same distinction helped expose a political fracture: an official close to the party’s planning regarded the campaign committee as serving Nixon personally rather than the Republican organization.

The evidence does not establish that the Republican National Committee authorized the break-in, knew of the alleged operation, or formally adopted the individual official’s suspicions. Nor does the official’s account by itself establish the guilt of the men he named. What it does establish is that the investigation encountered an insider willing to challenge the re-election committee’s explanation and to describe a conflict between the party’s institutional interests and the campaign organization’s loyalty to Richard Nixon.